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Abstract
The work of Paul Ricoeur is of much wider significance than just for the field of 
philosophy. This contribution discusses the impact of his ideas on developments 
in South Africa in three areas beyond philosophy: discourse analysis, concepts of 
selfhood, and the role of memory in social transformation. His dynamic understanding 
of communication helped to liberate discourse analysis in South Africa from an 
a-historical approach by focusing on the role of the reader, the context of reception and 
the transformative power of the text. His innovative work on the relationship between 
the self and the other has the potential to lead to a more inclusive understanding 
of being human together and to an enriched and expanded concept of identity. His 
extensive work on memory, history and forgetting can provide the basis to unlock the 
future potential of memory and for a memory liberated from being defined and held 
ransom by the past.
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1. Introduction
The impact of Paul Ricoeur’s work reaches far beyond national borders 
or the limits of philosophy itself. His reception in philosophical circles in 
this part of the world is evident from other contributions to this volume. 
Being neither a philosopher nor an expert on Ricoeur, my aim is to focus 
on his influence beyond philosophy. The intention is not to provide a 
comprehensive overview – historically or otherwise – but to discuss his 
significance in the context of the major social transformation which the 
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country experienced recently. As will become evident, in some areas 
his impact changed the course of events, in others it remains a potential 
influence not yet fully realized.
Tracing Paul Ricoeur’s impact in this way takes place against a specific 
existential backdrop. In the spirit of the theme of the conference (“From 
where do you speak?”), the context of the present analysis is that of a 
society grappling to rediscover, reimagine and rebuild a lost or at least 
a badly damaged humanity in the wake of a traumatic past, in a setting 
of continuing and even increasing inequality, battling with unresolved 
memories of injustice and violence. We find ourselves in the aftermath 
of a remarkable political and social transformation, guided by visionary 
leadership and with the promise of a more humane society. This dream 
came under severe strain during the last decade but is now showing 
signs of recovery. Personally, I speak as member of an older cohort who 
in many ways do not fully understand the aspirations and dreams of a 
new, often impatient and angry generation. And I speak as some-one 
who has structurally and personally benefitted from a previously unjust 
dispensation and who remains a beneficiary, regardless of how my views 
may have changed in the meantime.
Such existential concerns are not foreign to Ricoeur’s own approach. 
His perceptive and moving analysis of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’s work in both its successes and failures (Memory, History, 
Forgetting, 483–486) echoes this existential concern – although of course 
he was writing about an earlier phase of the process.
It is impossible to do justice to the rich and multifaceted contribution 
of Ricoeur, dealing with all its wide-ranging perspectives and its many 
original (and often provocative) insights. I shall therefore concentrate 
on three “spheres of influence” beyond philosophy: discourse analysis 
(focusing on his Interpretation Theory); selfhood (in conversation with The 
Oneself as Another) and memory (referring mainly to Memory, History, 
Forgetting)1. As will (hopefully) become clear in due course, all three are 
presented under the banner of “liberation”.
1 Subsequently quoted as IT, OA and MHF.
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2. Discourse analysis
The impact of Ricoeur on discourse analysis in South Africa, especially in the 
field of biblical exegesis, has been extensive. By the time his Interpretation 
Theory appeared in 1976, discourse analysis was the dominant method 
used by local interpreters of biblical material. There were historic reasons 
for this – in part the legacy of events during the twenties and thirties of the 
previous century which has had a lasting effect on the theory and practice 
of exegesis. I refer of course to the (in)famous Du Plessis saga2. Leaving 
the sensational details of the story aside, the heart of the matter had to do 
with the status of biblical texts, whether they contain timeless truths and 
therefore are “infallible”, but more importantly for our purpose, whether 
they are subject to historical change. Fundamentalism in theological 
circles has of course a long history and is certainly not restricted to South 
Africa. But here it became the willing partner in a political project which 
in the end produced an all-encompassing and all-pervasive ideology of 
“separate development”, based on the principle of racial segregation. The 
process was perhaps not initiated by theology, but certain theologians 
and influential parts of the church not only provided moral support and 
theological justification but also important conceptual ideas as part of the 
over-all enterprise.
The crucial factor in this regard was an a-historical view of the text and 
of social reality, resulting in a mind-set of closure and isolation. “Higher 
criticism” was the biggest threat to the idea of the infallibility of the bible and 
the “eternal truths” it contains. But how can one suppress the undeniable 
historical character of these texts? In this regard, the option offered 
by structuralist linguistics of a synchronic (as opposed to a diachronic) 
approach to the text provided a welcome escape route. More than thirty 
years after the Du Plessis case, under the influence of Eugene Nida and 
Jannie Louw, discourse analysis flourished in South Africa, but of a very 
specific kind. The leading concept was “text-immanent” exegesis, meaning 
that only the internal relations of the components of the text were taken to 
consideration, to the exclusion any historical issues of origin or pragmatic 
matters of application. The closure of the text also meant its isolation.
2 See Nash 1997, Lategan 2004.
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What was happening in the specialized field of exegesis had wider 
ramifications. The urge for closure and isolation affected not only theology, 
but also political and ideological thinking. The obsession with Grense (the 
title of a controversial book by the theologian-turned-politician Andries 
Treurnicht) was based on an understanding of borders as absolute barriers 
and not as porous demarcations. One of the notorious exegetical examples 
of the time was the interpretation of Acts 17:263 as part of the justification 
for apartheid. The statement that God had for all nations “marked out 
their appointed times in history and the boundaries of their lands” 
was understood as a validation of the policy of segregation. Boundaries 
(whether these were markers of geographical, cultural of racial divisions) 
were absolute, timeless and permanent – and in terms of the wider theology 
of the “orders of creation” (skeppingsordeninge) sacrosanct and immutable. 
Closure in this way ipso facto meant the exclusion of others.
What has all this to do with Ricoeur?
In some respects, Ricoeur was far removed from the internal ideological 
debates of the apartheid era and from the conservative biblical hermeneutics 
which developed in the wake of the Du Plessis case. In other respects there 
was an uncanny close link with the latter (even if Ricoeur himself was 
unaware of it). This link was not only the common emphasis on “discourse” 
(“discourse analysis” in the case of South African biblical hermeneutics 
and “discourse and the surplus of meaning” in the case of Ricoeur) but 
more importantly, his close familiarity with French structuralism and 
especially Saussurian linguistics which provided the basis for the “text-
immanent” exegesis practiced in South Africa. Ricoeur was fully aware 
of the underlying presuppositions of this linguistic approach and of the 
wider philosophical framework in which it was embedded. The important 
difference was that the conclusions he drew were in direct opposition to 
the way South African discourse analysis appropriated the same tradition. 
It is therefore necessary to say something more about the strategy which 
Ricoeur employed to arrive at his position.
3 “From one man he made all the nations, that they should inhabit the whole earth; and 
he marked out their appointed times in history and the boundaries of their lands” (New 
International Version).
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In his IT Ricoeur introduces three sets of binary relationships: “event and 
meaning”, “sense and reference”, and “explanation and understanding”. 
The dialectic tension between the members of each set is characteristic of 
most forms of communication and provides the dynamics which drives 
the process. Each component represents either a dynamic or a static 
moment which constantly alternates with the other. The (dynamic) event of 
experience or insight enables its retention in the form of a (static) message 
(written or otherwise); this (static) sense of the message inevitably points 
to its (dynamic) reference; the (static) explanation of this reference creates 
the conditions for (dynamic) understanding. This provides the rationale 
for Ricoeur’s focus on semantics rather than on semiotics – a distinction 
which for him was the key to the whole problem of language (IT 8).
Leaving technical details aside, what Ricoeur offers here is a fundamental 
critique of any a-historical approach to understanding and of any attempt 
to enclose the text within his own borders. As he explains in MHF (194, 247, 
253), this move was motivated by his own discomfort with the limitations 
of structuralism and its “disjunction between the internal structure of a 
text and any extratextual reality” (247).
The impact on biblical hermeneutics in South Africa was far-reaching. Not 
only did it put paid to the fundamentalist attempt to enclose the text within 
itself to safeguard it from the attacks of higher criticism and to render it 
immune to the ravages of time and the inevitability of historical change, 
but more importantly, it set the text free to unfurl to its full extent and to 
explore every perspective within its orbit.
This liberation was not restricted to the narrow terrain of linguistic 
construction or to the level of literary theory. It had a much wider 
significance – it opened the door for reception, the recognition of the 
importance of social location, and inadvertently contributed to the rise of 
contextual theology.
These developments cannot of course be solely ascribed to the influence of 
Ricoeur. Other important influences also played their part like reception 
theory, audience criticism, the rise of contextuality, the critique of 
foundationalism, and forms of liberation theology. Although Ricoeur was 
familiar with most of these, and although he worked in tandem with many 
of them (cf. his awareness of the role of the hearer, his use of speech act 
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theory and the like) he pioneered his own unique approach. His greatest 
contribution was to provide an overall framework to draw these diverse 
elements and forces together and to develop a more comprehensive way to 
account for the relations between them. This had profound consequences, 
some not so obvious at the time. I shall highlight only three of these which 
were of special significance in the South African context:
A fundamental shift in power relations
Breaking out of the text as an assumed closed structure by letting reference 
follow its course led eventually to an important shift in power relations. 
Traditionally the “author” or the “text” were in control of determining the 
meaning of the text. Recognizing the reader and especially the creative 
role of the reader in producing (or co-producing) meaning undermined 
this assumed dominance. In fact, it provided a real Archimedean point 
from where the status quo could be challenged, making it possible to 
critique embedded residues of dominance, be they of cultural, ecclesial, 
colonial, gender or whatever nature. The result was an extensive liberation 
and “democratization” of the reading process, opening it up to a whole 
new range of readers. Reading from the perspective of the oppressed, the 
marginalized and the formerly excluded became an important strategy 
for all kinds of liberation theologies and identity politics. In some cases 
the pendulum swung to the other extreme, where identity politics led to 
new forms of exclusion. In order to safeguard the privileges claimed for the 
group, its borders became narrower and narrower and those who qualified 
fewer and fewer.
Broadening – and balancing – the scope of interaction
Secondly, Ricoeur’s comprehensive approach expanded the scope of 
communicative interaction. The emphasis on the “social location” of the 
reader/hearer, awareness of the position “from where I speak” and the 
productive role of the allowed contemporary and unconventional readers 
to join in the conversation. But this development could also lead to a 
certain imbalance in the reading process – which in some cases resulted in 
the reader becoming the main or sole arbiter of the “meaning” of the text.
In this regard Ricoeur had a sobering influence with this insistence on both 
the “right of the reader and the right of the text” which “converge in an 
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important struggle that generates the whole dynamic of interpretation” (IT 
32). Without going into the details of the intriguing exchanges between 
the implied and real reader and the implied and real author (cf. Lategan 
2009:466–468), it suffices to say that by incorporating both the static and 
dynamic aspects of the text in a comprehensive understanding of the text, 
Ricoeur restored a much-needed balance between the various drivers of 
the process.
The transformative power of proposed worlds
One of the most consequential insights of Ricoeur is the transformative 
nature of discourse itself. He writes: “The inscription of discourse is the 
transcription of the world, and transcription is not reduplication, but 
metamorphosis” (IT 42). This becomes a basic premise not only of his 
historiography, but also underpins the very act of writing which by definition 
cannot be a reduplication of reality. A whole network of interrelated 
considerations thus came into play, which leads to his well-known concept 
of the re-description of reality, offering “a proposed world which I could 
inhabit” (2016:72). This holds both for non-fictional and fictional texts who 
each presents this alternative world by different means. Once the contours 
of such a world is recognized, it becomes a desired outcome and acts as a 
powerful means of transformation.
Local examples of such proposed worlds which are couched in visionary, 
prophetic, theological or legal language are the Freedom Charter (1955) 
with its repetitive use of the prophetic “shall” to outline the contours of a 
non-racial South Africa; the Belhar Confession (1986) with its rejection of 
the idea of the irreconcilability of people and its vision of a just society; The 
Option for Inclusive Democracy (1987) with its emphasis on human dignity, 
equality, unity, freedom, rights and responsibility; and the South African 
Constitution (1996) with its vision of an inclusive democracy based on a set 
of fundamental human rights.
As far as discourse analysis is concerned, Ricoeur has had a real and lasting 
effect on developments in South Africa. He helped to liberate the text from 
its static and restricted existence to open vistas not only “in” or “behind”, 
but especially “in front of” the text. In contrast, in the areas of selfhood and 
memory, his impact is at this stage more of a potential nature.
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3. Selfhood
The second area of influence concerns the kind of society South Africans 
are trying to establish in the wake of apartheid. To link this to what has 
been said above about “proposed worlds”, let us take the preamble to the 
Constitution of 1996 as our point of departure:
We, the people of South Africa … adopt this Constitution … so 
as to heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; 
lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which 
government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is 
equally protected by law; improve the quality of life of all citizens 
and free the potential of each person …
At the root of the divisions to be healed lies the vexed issue of identity – more 
precisely, concepts of selfhood and their specific use in the South African 
context. Without getting drawn into the details of this over-researched, 
over-discussed and still unresolved topic4, it is important to remember that 
the very origin of selfhood is premised on the awareness of difference – 
the realization that I am not like others, that I am my own person. This 
is the essential prerequisite for any sense of personal identity. But this 
“primordial” realization of being different can be extended in one of two 
directions – towards detachment and alienation or towards convergence 
and solidarity.
Especially in societies with high levels of diversity like South Africa (and 
Africa for that matter), difference almost by default attracts negative 
associations. What is unfamiliar and strange quickly becomes a threat, and 
the other appears as a potential enemy. The usual strategies to deal with this 
discomfort are separation, distanciation, and isolation – the same forces 
we encountered in our discussion of discourse analysis and the attempted 
imprisonment of the text. In the case of identity this manifests itself as 
a process of contraction and isolation, retreating behind the (assumed 
safe) bulwark of a “mono”-identity. Difference thus becomes the means to 
4 See for example Erikson 1966, 1980, Marcia 1966, Waterman 1984, Berzonsky 1990, 
Cass 1996, Castells 1997, Grotevant 1997, Malouf 2000, Stets & Burke 2000, Sen 2006, 
Van Huyssteen 2006, Roefs 2006, Goosens 2008, Steinberg 2008, Clingman 2009.
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divide and rule, resulting in the well-known system of classification (and 
discrimination) on the basis of culture, class and race.
Reversing this trend is easier said than done. Many “solutions” are either 
too shallow or too idealistic to be effective. The “melting-pot” idea seldom 
takes the tenacity of remaining “own” identities fully into account. The plea 
for “tolerance” is too weak to overcome the power which keep differences 
intact.
In this regard Ricoeur opens other perspectives. His essays on reconnaissance 
and especially his Oneself as Another, provide a rich resource to rethink 
our concepts of selfhood and the dynamics of identity formation. His 
intriguing proposal in Oneself as Another invites further exploration5:
Oneself as another suggests from the outset that the selfhood of 
oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot 
be thought of without the other, that instead one passes into the 
other, as we might say in Hegelian terms. To ‘as’ I should like to 
attach a strong meaning, not only that of a comparison (oneself 
similar to another) but indeed that of an implication (oneself 
inasmuch as being other) (OA 3).
What this “being other” exactly entails remains unclear – an issue to which 
we shall return shortly. It is impossible to do full justice here to Ricoeur’s 
many-faceted explorations of “a hermeneutics of the self” (OA 1). I shall 
restrict my remarks to three aspects which are of specific relevance for our 
theme.
The first aspect relates to the inherent reflective nature of the self. Instead 
of “the immediate positing of the subject” as an “I”, the “self” already 
presupposes a reflective detour (OA 1). Personal identity is therefore not a 
fixed entity, but a temporal dimension of human existence (OA 114) and the 
result of a dynamic process of being constituted.
The second is the role of the other in the formation of the self. Far from 
being an outsider, the other is intimately involved in the realization of the 
5 It is important to keep in mind that this is not the first formulation of selfhood in terms 
of the other – human solidarity has a long history on the African continent, expressed 
by a variety of images and expressions of which “I am a human being through other 
human beings” is one of the best known.
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self. This depends on the “dialectic of self and the other than self ” (OA 3). 
The “need and lack” of the self, that “what one is incapable of procuring by 
oneself” (with reference to Aristotle – OA 185) requires the “mediation of 
the other” (with reference to Charles Taylor – OA 181). What is needed is 
“the internalization of the voice of the Other in the Same” (OA 339).
The third is the recognition of the complex or multiple nature of identity 
itself – or what Ricoeur calls the “plurality in the very constitution of 
the self” (OA 296). Attempts to reduce identity to a single denominator 
by eliminating all that the self is not, are doomed to fail. This means that 
selfhood is not only open to change, but also to expansion and enrichment.
The self is therefore “work in progress”. It is a living thing and therefore 
open to re-imagination, expansion and adjustment. While the sense of 
being the same person remains intact, the self is continuously changing. 
Ricoeur thus provides an important Vorlage and an ideal starting point 
for our purpose, namely (as he himself formulates it) “the formation of a 
concept of selfhood defined by its openness and its capacity to discover” 
(OA 339).
But can these ideas be taken further and tested in more demanding 
circumstances? Much of what Ricoeur writes about reciprocal relations 
between the self and the other still remains within the amicable sphere 
of “friendship’ (OA 180–194). Would it still hold in a hostile environment 
marked by suspicion and alienation? In other words, what does this mean in 
the context like South Africa where – despite good intentions and strenuous 
efforts – the dominating paradigm (physically and psychologically) is still 
one of distance and separation? As we have seen, the experience of the 
self and the other (both from the perspective of the colonized and of the 
colonizer) has from the start been framed in terms of difference, steeped 
in adversarial imagery and driven by the experience of strangeness and the 
consciousness of distance. Despite traditions of mutual interdependence 
and of human solidarity that were available at the time, despite historical 
examples which proved the opposite, the dominant experience and 
consciousness was that of contrast and dissimilarity. This was reinforced 
by ideological driven policies and practices of separation, classification 
and denigration. An already fragile humanity was structurally and 
forcefully segmented even deeper. The distance between the self and the 
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other appeared to be unbridgeable both conceptually and in terms of social 
relations. The basic premise of this mind-set – as subsequently formulated 
in the Belhar Confession – is the irreconcilability (onversoenbaarheid) of 
people. The pervasiveness of this mentality is evident in its continuing 
reappearance in different guises – the latest example being the sporadic 
flaring of xenophobic violence in South Africa.
Is a different approach thinkable? What if we see strangeness as a resource 
and the other as catalyst to restore our own humanity? The case for the 
(counter-intuitive) embracing of strangeness and of the other has been 
argued more extensively elsewhere (Lategan 2018) – here only a bare 
outline can be presented.
First of all, a preliminary but crucial step needs to be taken. Before the gap 
to the other can be bridged, before we can show solicitude (SO 189–190) 
or apply the golden rule (OA 320) as Ricoeur urges us to do, the ground 
for this to happen must first be prepared by establishing a broader base in 
the self. As Ricoeur himself points out, intersubjectivity starts within the 
self by the “derivation of a unique kind of alter ego starting from the ego” 
(OA 323). This “internal” subjectivity provides the basis for an “external” 
intersubjectivity. It is not what the self does to others, but what happens to 
the self that should be the starting point.
Secondly, a reversal of a different kind is required: from a negative to a 
positive appreciation of strangeness and the other. Our “natural” instinct 
is to treat the unfamiliar and the other with caution and suspicion – what is 
strange is not only experienced as uncomfortable, but often as threatening 
and dangerous. In an attempt to deal with this situation, a whole range of 
strategies is employed – with manifestations in history, culture, religion, art 
and many other fields – to “domesticate” the stranger. This can be done by 
more peaceful or by more aggressive means, ranging from neutralization, 
“cleansing”, annexation, assimilation, conversion, “re-education”, 
subjection, enslavement, and even elimination. In all these instances, the 
self remains the standard to which the other is compared and by which the 
stranger is judged.
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But what if the unfamiliar becomes the stimulus to explore alternative 
viewpoints, to complete our own incompleteness6, expose ourselves to 
worlds far beyond our own limited experience? What if the other is not 
only seen as an opponent or stranger to be avoided or resisted, but as a 
rich resource and as the key to a fuller understanding of what it means 
and can mean to be human? This opens the possibility of an extension and 
enrichment of the self which can serve as a more secure bridgehead to build 
those bridges we talk so much about, daring us to cross the divide – the 
very step we are hesitant to take despite our pious declarations that “we 
really should get together”.
With this expansion and enrichment also comes a liberation of a special 
kind – a liberation consisting in the first place of a critical awareness of 
and a conscious effort to distance oneself from oneself and from embedded 
stereotypes and prejudice. As Simmel points out, because the stranger as 
outsider is at a distance, he or she offers a certain “objectivity” that frees 
us from our preconceived ideas7. But the concept has wider implications. 
It also implies freeing oneself from the confines of a narrow set of defence 
mechanisms which usually structure relations with the other – mechanisms 
of justification, demarcation, exclusion and entitlement. There is a much 
wider spectrum of modalities available for shaping the interaction with the 
other, like engagement, inclusion, respect, esteem and reconciliation. All of 
these have the potential to provide stronger foundations for the so much 
desired more humane society.
4. Memory
The third area of influence concerns memory, the main theme of Ricoeur’s 
magnus opus Memory, History and Forgetting. Here he integrates many of 
the wide-ranging ideas which occupied him all through his life8. Again, 
it will be impossible to traverse this vast landscape in any detail. I shall 
6 Cf. Nyamnjoh 2015.
7 “ … he (the stranger) is freer practically and theoretically; he surveys conditions with 
less prejudice; his criteria for them are more general and more objective ideals; he is not 
tied down in his action by habit, piety, and precedent” (Simmel 1950[1908]:403).
8 The present attempt to open a future for memory has as background the incredibly 
rich and dense discussion of MHF and its long and intense exploration of the enduring 
dialectic between memory and history (see Part 3 of the book, especially 393). A brief 
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concentrate on one concern which has important existential implications in 
the context of South Africa, namely the directional orientation of memory.
The lodestar of Ricoeur’s exploration is Aristotle’s dictum: “All memory is 
of the past” (MHF 6). This fixation on the past is not without problems, for 
Ricoeur at the same time admits that memory as such only functions in the 
present. He writes: “…the return of a memory can only take place in the 
mode of becoming-an-image” (MHF 7). These images are operational in 
the present, not in the past. It is this tension between the orientation (that 
is, towards the past) and the mode of memory (as a phenomenon in the 
present) which we shall take as our cue for this final section.
While it is no doubt true that the object, or shall we rather say the subject 
matter of memory is the past, it is equally clear that the same mediating, 
detouring, and interpretive process which we encountered in our discussion 
of discourse and of selfhood is at work here. Because of the pastness of the 
past we do not have direct access to it, but only via a reconstruction of that 
past. Even in its “scientific” version as history, where the obligation is to 
verify the validity of its truth claims, such (oral or written) history already 
represents a “re-telling”, and thus a reconstruction in itself9.
Just as it is impossible to restrict the reference of discourse to the limits of 
the text, it is likewise impossible to confine memory to the prison of the 
past. This is what Ricoeur senses when he makes the distinction between 
Vergangenheit (the irrevocable lost past) and Gewesenheit (the past that is 
still present – MHF 362).
The term “present” refers of course to a relative point in time. What at a 
certain stage is still “future”, inevitably becomes “present” and is just as 
surely doomed to become “past” as time moves on10. These are positions 
on one and the same timeline, a line that is – most importantly for our 
analysis cannot deal with all the complex and intertwined themes and sub-themes 
which Ricoeur explores here so patiently and masterfully.
9 To repeat Ricoeur’s own statement which we quoted in the first section: “The inscription 
of discourse is the transcription of the world, and transcription is not reduplication, but 
metamorphosis” – IT 42).
10 Cf. MHF 433–4: “An important corollary to the thesis of the survival of images of the 
past in a state of latency is, in fact, that any given present is, from the moment of its 
appearance, its own past. For how could it become past if it were not constituted at the 
same time as it was present?”
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argument – bi-directional, in the sense that it is open to perspectives in 
both directions.
What would happen if we start to explore the future potential of memory? 
This may not be so nonsensical as it sounds. The persistence of memory 
(in whatever form – as recollection, re-presentation, or re-imagination) is 
the consequence of a certain “excess of memory” which propels it forward. 
Ricoeur himself offers some hints in this regard. In an intriguing passage, 
he commends Todorov’s advice to extract “the exemplary value” from 
traumatic experiences and then adds: “If the trauma refers to the past, the 
exemplary value is directed to the future” (MHF 86). How this re-direction 
should be achieved in practice, remains unclear.
We therefore need a “conceptual readjustment” – to use a formulation 
of Ricoeur in a different context (OA 311). My proposal is to reverse the 
direction of orientation and follow the trajectory of memory not towards the 
past but along its thrust towards the future. The inherent logic of memory 
propels it in this direction. Between the closed and already determined 
realities which constitute the past, memory is a phenomenon of the present 
which has the potential to mediate the possibilities still open for the future.
The plea is not to forget the past. In this regard, Ricoeur’s views on 
forgetting are problematic. In essence, forgetting acquires for him negative 
associations – it is a lack, a danger to be avoided. But then again it is a 
necessary condition for forgiveness (MHF 412). This tension give rise to all 
kinds of confusion (MHF 412, 414, 479).
Lapses of memory no doubt cause their own difficulties, but of far greater 
importance is the constitutive role of forgetting in the very formation of 
memory. Memory is what remains after we have forgotten. It comes onto 
being by virtue of forgetting, or to put it differently, memory depends on 
forgetting. Memory gets its distinctive profile by chipping away those bits 
we do not remember.
Forgetting as such is therefore not the problem, at least not as far as 
enduring memories are concerned – that is, memories we cannot forget. 
The intensity of destructive memories and traumatic experiences makes 
it unrealistic – and disrespectful – to expect victims to forget and “just 
move on”. The ineradicable nature of these memories and the finality of 
unchangeable past events rule out forgetting as an option.
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But is the mantra of the future potential of memory anything more than 
just another catchy slogan? What does it mean in concrete terms? I would 
suggest that it comprises of a comprehensive re-orientation which affects 
the process of remembering on different levels.
On the most basic level it entails a reversal of perspective, shifting the focus 
of memory from its fixation on the past to its implications for the future as 
we have explained above.
On a second level, it means expanding the modes of remembering to include 
more than the customary justification of anger and pain, the historical 
grounding of past injustices or the validation of claims for restoration. The 
challenge is to think creatively how a specific memory can actually shape 
the future, thereby ensuring that it becomes part of that future. This is a 
more enduring way in which injustices of the past can influence future 
developments.
On a third level, it means going beyond a preventative understanding of 
memory, that is, an understanding that has as its main goal to prevent bad 
things from happening again. The famous statement of Nelson Mandela 
will forever ring true: “Never, never and never again shall it be that this 
beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another”. But 
this is only half the story. We cannot contend ourselves only with what 
should not happen. Of equal (and perhaps even greater) importance is what 
should happen.
Ricoeur provides us with a chilling reminder in this regard (MHF 328). 
Because the Soviet Gulag system of prison camps was only remembered as 
a past event and did not receive any “positive” future, because an alternative 
approach was neither imagined, articulated nor propagated, it became a 
model which could be repeated again – in even more grotesque form – at 
Auschwitz and the like.
On a fourth level, it means accepting the dynamic, changing nature of 
memory, the fact that our memories are evolving, that they are open to 
criticism and correction, that they can be adjusted and recalibrated, 
without denying or betraying what did happen.
This even applies to trauma, of which I am hesitant to speak because it is 
such a personal matter. But if trauma can be more than merely re-living 
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a horrific event, and become a re-imagined way to affect the future, it 
might assist in breaking out of the downward spiral of despondency and 
hopelessness.
To be more specific:
• What would be an alternative future for the hatred of Afrikaners 
towards the British for the deaths of thousands in the concentration 
camps and the devastation of farms as part of a scorched earth policy?
• What alternative to revenge and retaliation against those responsible 
for the horror of the Sharpeville massacre?
• What alternative to the indiscriminate killings at Marikana, despite 
a “new” South Africa and a Constitution with an internationally 
applauded Bill of Human Rights?
• What alternative to the emotive question of land redistribution – 
fuelled on the one hand by deeply inscribed memories of humiliation 
and injustice and the damage caused by large-scale dispossession and 
forced removals and on the other hand by memories of a “century 
of injustice”, the painful reclaiming of land and property and then 
handed down over generations?
If no future dimension can be discovered in these painful memories they 
will continue to block creative solutions which are there for the taking and 
which can open real possibilities of “a better life for all”.
Even in extreme cases where the memory is so abhorrent that any reference 
to its possible “future” seems a mockery, such a memory still has the 
possibility to transcend its past on the strength of the inexorable logic 
which drives it forward. A case in point is the series of conversations Pumla 
Gobodo-Madikizela had with the condemned Vlakplaas murderer Eugene 
de Kock, known as “Prime Evil”. What prompted Gobodo-Madikezela to 
make contact with de Kock in the first place was not merely curiosity to get 
“inside the head” of such a ruthless operator, but the unexpected response 
of two of the widows of his victims when they met him face to face. They 
sensed that something more was happening – a “surplus” they could not 
explain but which prompted one of them, Mrs. Faku, to say afterwards: “I 
would like to hold his hand, and show him that there is a future, and that 
he still can change”. They sensed that something more was happening – a 
“surplus” they could not explain. Gobodo-Madikizela (2003: 15) comments:
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“The image of the widow reaching out to her husband’s murderer 
struck me as an extraordinary expression – an act – of empathy, to 
shed tears not only for her loss but also, it seemed, for the loss of de 
Kock’s moral humanity.”
What makes the difference even in such extreme cases is the “more” of 
memory which opens unexpected possibilities. Let me be clear that the 
future envisioned here is not the “anticipation of possibility” implied 
by Heidegger’s “Sein-zum-Tode” with its narrow and negative focus 
(Heidegger 1962: 242, MHF 356). The “excess of memory” surpassing the 
past which is at stake here is not driven by Angst for death, but by life in all 
its fullness and joy.
5. Conclusion
Hopefully these few remarks, often merely touching the surface of 
things will suffice to demonstrate that Ricoeur’s influence stretches far 
beyond philosophy and that it is of special significance to South Africa. 
As we have seen, in some areas his work has already changed the course 
of events – in other cases it is still a potential impact. In all three areas, 
we encountered recurring themes – the mediated and therefore dynamic 
nature of discourse, of selfhood and of memory, the resistance to closure 
and restriction, the power of dialectic opposites, the promise of a future-
oriented perspective, and the priority of the possible above what is real. 
But above all the liberating thrust of his thought, leading to freedom of a 
special kind – freedom from the confines of an enclosed text, from a mono- 
and an impoverished self and from a memory defined and held ransom by 
the past.
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